

## DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AND AMERICANS' SUPPORT FOR TROOP USE

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**Abstract.** This paper examines the effect of citizens' belief in democracy promotion on their foreign policy opinion. While it has been debated whether idealism plays a significant role in accounting for citizens' opinion on foreign policy, few studies tackle the issue empirically. Two hypotheses are proposed and tested in this study in regards to the effect of an ideal, democracy promotion, on public opinion about troop deployments. It uses the surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 1998, 2004, 2008, and 2012. The findings show that democracy promotion is one of the most important sources for citizens' support for U.S. troop deployment. Also, the effect of democracy promotion depends on political context.

**Keywords:** democracy promotion, foreign policy, American public opinion, troop use, idealism

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### 1. Introduction

What is the role of a foreign policy ideal – democracy promotion - in shaping public opinion on foreign policy?<sup>1</sup> The experience of the 9/11 attacks on American soil, the ensuing wars against Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Bush administration's adoption of a new foreign policy doctrine brought the ideal of democracy promotion to the forefront of American foreign policy. While studies of public opinion on foreign policy have focused mainly on examining the existence of organized belief systems and the reasonableness of public opinion in foreign affairs, we know little about the role of democracy promotion in forming public opinion. The experience of the Bush administration's emphasis on democracy

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<sup>1</sup> The data sets for the analysis of this study are available at the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) or the Roper Center.

promotion in U.S. foreign policy and the debate about the role of idealism and realism in accounting for citizens' opinion on foreign policy demands a closer examination of the role of belief in this ideal in shaping public opinion in foreign policy. In addition, the way in which citizens' belief in democracy promotion defines their opinions on foreign policy also needs to be elaborated. Specifically, it is necessary to explore the working mechanisms of this ideal goal in relation to political context.

In studying public opinion on foreign policy, a major concern has been whether the mass public can make reasonable decisions. The majority of studies have attempted to counter negative views on the capacity of the mass public to do so. Lippmann (1955), Almond (1960[1950]), and Converse (1964) criticized public opinion on foreign policy as unstable, unorganized, and unreliable due to the lack of interests, information, and ideological constraints. However, along with the emerging studies that emphasized positive views of mass public opinion regarding domestic policy (e.g. Kinder 1983, Feldman 1988), studies on public opinion on foreign policy shifted toward optimistic views by showing the existence of organized belief systems (e.g. Wittkopf 1986, Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995, Holsti 1992), the role of social and psychological constraints in maintaining the belief systems (e.g. Hurwitz and Peffley 1987), and citizens' strategic and instrumental considerations in foreign policy choices (e.g. Jentleson 1992, Jentleson and Britton 1998, Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999).

While these studies provide us with persuasive theories and evidence regarding the existence of structure and organization of the public's foreign policy attitudes and capacity to come up with reasonable decisions, they have a limitation in understanding the role of democracy promotion, since most of the studies that focused on the structure did not pay attention to the ideal itself, let alone to its role in shaping public opinion on foreign policy. This lack of interest in democracy promotion is ironic in that the debate about the relevance and effectiveness of idealism in American foreign policy has been around for a long time among scholars of international politics (e.g. Morgenthau 1952, Kennan 1984, Osgood 1953, Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi 2000). Furthermore, democracy promotion is the core concern of liberal idealists (e.g. Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi 2000, Diamond 1992) and neo-conservatists (e.g. Kristol and Kagan 1996) alike. However, we know little about the characteristics and working mechanisms of this ideal in forming public opinion on foreign policy. What will be the effect of democracy promotion on foreign policy opinion? Under what conditions will the effect of the belief in this ideal be strengthened, weakened or remain stable in accounting for citizens' foreign policy choices? This study finds that individuals' belief in democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal plays a significant role in accounting for their support for U.S. troop deployments in defending allies from potential enemies and hostile countries. Also it shows that the effect of democracy promotion depends on political context.

## 2. Democracy promotion and public opinion on foreign policy

As scholars and political theorists (e.g. Tocqueville 1966, Myrdal 1944, Hartz 1955) have pointed out, liberal democracy and democratic ideals are at the core of American culture and politics, which differentiates America from Old Europe and sets it apart from other parts of the world. Tocqueville (1966) characterizes America as a society in which equality of conditions prevails. He suggests that geographic isolation, ample economic opportunities, favorable social conditions, and an intellectual heritage from England that also included Enlightenment ideals contribute to supporting an American democracy in which equality, freedom, and property rights are guaranteed. Similarly Myrdal (1944) asserts that America differs from other countries in that it is unified under an American Creed which represents the combined ideals of democracy. He goes further by stressing that “the American Creed is identified with America’s peculiar brand of nationalism, and it gives the common American his feeling of the historical mission of America in the world” (Myrdal 1944:5). He emphasizes this point by saying that American nationalism is permeated by the American Creed, and therefore becomes international in its essence (Myrdal 1944:6). Paine (1984) also expresses his strong belief in the virtue of American democracy over the Old World monarchical system and his wish to spread democracy to the Continent in his renowned book, *Rights of Man*. In his letter to Lafayette in 1792, Paine expresses his optimistic belief on the possibility and need of spreading democracy to other parts of the world. He hoped that Lafayette’s military campaign would “terminate in the extinction of German despotism, and in establishing the freedom of all Germany” (1984:151–152, quoted in Walker (2008), 450).

In addition to these political theorists, there are studies (e.g. Brands 1998, Morten 2005) that point out democracy and democracy promotion as a core value characterizing American exceptionalism by focusing on the central role of ideals in U.S. foreign policy. Democracy, as a value and an ideal institution, is at the core of foreign policy ideal. According to Brands (1998) and Monten (2005) there are two components of American liberal exceptionalism: exemplarism and vindicalism<sup>2</sup>. Exemplarism captures the belief that democratic institutions and values of the U.S. should be protected and perfected at home first; i.e., the U.S. should influence the world by setting an example, not by using force. It includes the concern that active involvement in foreign policy may undermine democracy at home (Monten 2005:113, Brands 1998:vii-viii). In contrast, “vindicalism” reflects the belief that the U.S. should “move beyond example and undertake

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<sup>2</sup> Similar studies (e.g. Burns 1957, McDougall 1997, Schlesinger Jr. 1986) on the history of American identity, culture, and foreign policy propose that America is exceptional in its place in the world due to its adherence to idealism (liberal democracy) and its belief in its purpose of achieving a God-given mission - creating “the City upon a hill” – as a chosen people. Lipset (1996) characterizes America as exceptional due to its foundation on idealism rather than being a traditional birthright community. According to him, the exceptionalism is based on five core ideals: liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism, and laissez-faire (Lipset 1996:31).

active measures to vindicate the right” (Brands 1998:viii), and it is the mission of the U.S. to spread its universal political values and institutions by actively taking measures beyond mere passive example setting. According to these scholars, during the early period of the United States up to the Spanish war in 1898, exemplarism remained dominant mainly due to the limited power of the U.S. in the international arena. But as the political and economic power of the U.S. became prominent and was combined with an emerging idealist passion supported by Progressivism, vindicationism gained a stronger voice in foreign policy making, and the public mood swung toward the belief.

Monten (2005) argues that the Bush doctrine originates from the same vindicationism. When a political power wishes to evangelize and the political environment provides the opportunity that such evangelism can flourish, vindicationism arises. The terrorists’ 9/11 attacks on America, the un-paralleled unipolar power of the U.S., and a dominant neoconservatism provided fertile ground and ripe conditions for vindicationism. While the advocates of these two aspects of liberal exceptionalism differ in their beliefs regarding the nature of human beings and power, they agree that both idealisms share the belief that America is an example from which the world can learn and that democracy is at the core of the American identity. The two different types of liberal exceptionalism share a common belief in the central importance of democracy and in America’s role as a key player in making a new world by spreading democracy. These two elements define the identity of America and its foreign policy.

Another group of scholars who are critical of the aspect of ideology or ideals of American exceptionalism represented by democracy or liberty promotion point out that this missionary zeal is at the core of American foreign policy (e.g. Hunt 1987, Lieven 2004, McCartney 2004). They do not distinguish the potential conflict within liberal exemplarism. Instead these studies see the inherent missionary zeal in the core belief of American exceptionalism based on democracy. For example, Hunt (1987) argues that exporting liberty is one of the core ideologies along with racism and negative belief in revolution that has directed American foreign policy since the inception of the country. Although he does not clearly state that liberty is equal in status to democracy as an institution and norm, his definition of the term liberty is consistent with democracy as that ideal is used here. Pursuing the greatness of America by expanding liberty in North America and the world is a consistently primary ideology of U.S. foreign policy. Similarly, Lieven (2004) and McCartney (2004) propose that a creedal belief in democracy promotion represents American nationalism and identity, which tend to lead to a “missionary” approach in dealing with other nations by painting others a morally wrong and evil but the U.S. as inherently good. According to these studies, regardless of party differences, democracy promotion has been and is a core American foreign policy ideal. In line with these scholars, traditional realists (e.g. Morgenthau 1973, Morgenthau 1952, Kennan 1984) criticize the public’s inability to take a realist stance in dealing with foreign policy. Instead of considering national interests and power, the public is more easily motivated by such “utopian” ideals as

humanitarianism, democracy, international cooperation, and world peace. According to Morgenthau (1952), national interests (e.g. a nation's security, the protection of economic interests, and the maintenance of superior military power) should be the most important standards for foreign policy decision-making. He warned that citizens are too easily motivated and persuaded by utopian ideals. Similarly, Mearsheimer (2001:23) argues that "Americans tend to be hostile to realism because it clashes with their basic values." Here he refers to the above mentioned values that liberalism espouses. According to him, Americans hold to moralistic and legalistic principles because they lack detailed information about international affairs and are influenced by emotional appeals by elites and the mass media.

This wide range of scholars suggests that the public's belief in democracy promotion will be an important source for citizens' foreign policy attitudes. However, there are scholars (e.g. Holsti 2004, Drezner 2010) who point out that these ideals are not that popular among the mass public, and rather that they are more concerned about national and economic security. They show that Americans' support for promoting democracy is lower than for other realists' foreign policy goals (e.g. protecting jobs, securing energy, and maintaining superior military power) by using survey data from the CCGA. Thus, they argue that the mass public's opinion on foreign policy is closer to that of realists. Similarly, other studies (e.g. Jentleson 1992, Jentleson and Britton 1998) show that citizens are more supportive of military interventions to achieve realist goals (e.g. defending allies) than to achieve idealist goals (e.g. domestic regime change). These findings suggest that the public is concerned more about realist goals and motivated by them in making their foreign policy opinion.

What should be the expectation on the role of a belief in democracy promotion in explaining citizens' foreign policy opinion? A general prediction based on the above mentioned studies is that democracy promotion, along with other realist goals, will play a significant role in defining public attitudes toward foreign policy. Those who believe in democracy promotion are more likely to support policies that require U.S. military intervention in international affairs. Consistent with explanations of various studies (McCartney 2004, Monten 2005, Lieven 2004), democracy promotion would foster active international interventions, which could involve sending troops as well as employing non-militaristic options.

As I use individuals' belief in democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal, it is necessary to describe briefly how individuals' belief in goals would play a significant role in shaping their opinions and how their beliefs in goals are related to values and postures.

Previous studies (e.g. Feldman 1988, Conover and Feldman 1984, Sears 1993, Kinder and Sears 1985) on public opinion and values show that values are the central elements of the mass public's belief systems and play a significant role in shaping policy attitudes and behaviors. As individuals learn values from their childhood, values tend to remain stable over their lifetimes. Also they are influential in public opinion due to the primacy and stability of values. Values are considered as "general and enduring standards" (Kinder and Sears 1985:674) or

defined as “an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence” (Rokeach 1973:5). Thus values hold a “more central position than attitudes” in individuals’ belief systems and guide or direct specific decisions or preferences (Kinder and Sears 1985). Because of these characteristics, values “lead us to take particular positions on social issues” (Rokeach 1973:13). Furthermore, as Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) pointed out, citizens’ lack of knowledge on foreign policy and their limitations in cognitive ability to process information cause them to work as cognitive misers who rely on simplified information and short cuts in forming their opinions. Thus, enduring abstract beliefs like values and postures can provide short cuts for individuals, so that they can make reasonable decisions with respect to specific policies without knowing details of foreign affairs. The main reasons why individuals can rely on these values and postures is not only this ease of being adopted and used without knowing details of international affairs, but also that they are readily attached with emotion, and they can be invoked easily due to cultural and symbolic prevalence in the society (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987:1106). Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) distinguish values and postures based on whose goals they reference. Values are individuals’ personal goals in their life, while postures are a government’s goals in international affairs. A general commonality of these studies is that individuals’ beliefs in goals are important bases for their attitudes due to the characteristics of values and postures. Thus, individuals’ belief in democracy promotion as a goal will have a similar effect on their attitudes toward specific foreign policy issues.

A major difference between these values and postures and the belief in democracy promotion is the measurement. While values and postures are measures of the underlying concept of individual goals, the belief in democracy promotion is a single item-based belief in a goal. In this sense, the belief in democracy promotion shares the characteristics of values and postures in its role in directing and guiding specific attitudes. It allows individuals to engage in purpose- or principle-directed behavior. Despite the fact that a single item measured goal may have weaker empirical power, this belief in a goal will behave in a similar way to values and postures in directing, organizing, and forming individuals’ attitude toward foreign policy.

### **3. Democracy promotion, political context, and opinion**

A theoretical question related to the effect of belief in democracy promotion on foreign policy is that of the way that political context and external events can affect the effect of this ideal in shaping public opinion. What is the relationship between political context and individuals’ belief in democracy promotion? Since belief in democracy promotion as a foreign policy goal is close to the definition of postures and values, the existing studies provide guidelines for how political contexts and predispositions influence the effect of democracy promotion. While

the stability of values is one of their most important characteristics (e.g. Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach 1989, Inglehart and Abramson 1994), values can and do change under certain conditions. Studies on values change suggest a possible mechanism of changing the effect of democracy promotion on opinion. External events can influence the way in which individuals adopt the democracy promotion goal in forming their opinions. For example, if the external conditions make an ideal more relevant in forming an opinion toward a political object, the effect of the belief in this ideal is more likely to be stronger than in other cases. Inglehart and Abramson (1994) point out that broader social-economic contexts affect individuals' acceptance of materialism or postmaterialism. As a society experiences different stages of economic development, individuals will adopt the values that reflect the needs of the society in each stage. Even within the same society, as economic conditions change, the adoption of values shifts according to that change. Similarly, as Rokeach and Ball-Rokeach (1989) argue, individuals' dissatisfaction with current changes in political environments could trigger a change in value priorities. According to them, white Americans' belief in egalitarianism during the early 1970s was high, but this value had sunk significantly in importance by the late 1970s and early 1980s, as white Americans experienced insecurity due to economic depression and dissatisfaction with affirmative action policies which had been designed to protect minorities, including women. Studies (Monten 2005, McCartney 2004) show that the strength and effect of nationalism and belief in democracy promotion depends on the political context; especially when the U.S. engaged in war or was under attack, the ideal gained prominence. Thus, it is expected that while the influence of democracy promotion will be consistent over different time periods, the influence could fluctuate according to political conditions. Especially when there exist political conditions that would foster the salience and relevance of the ideal in forming public opinion, the effect of the ideal on policy should be stronger than at other times. Specifically, the effect of democracy promotion will be stronger after the Bush administration began to emphasize the ideal goals in justifying the invasion of Iraq.

#### **4. Hypotheses**

Based on the discussion of the theory of democracy promotion and political context, two hypotheses will be drawn and tested. To test the hypotheses, the attitudes toward troop deployments will be used as dependent variables. Since sending troops to other parts of the world is one of the most crucial areas of foreign policy decisions, it is important to understand how the goal of democracy promotion relates to the policy decision.

The first hypothesis is that democracy promotion will be a significant factor in accounting for public opinion on support for war. Specifically, those who believe in democracy promotion are more likely to be supportive of troop deployment to defend allies and to pursue idealistic goals in world affairs. This will be the case

since idealistic goals tend to promote active international involvement in the name of those ideals.

Second, as the theory of democracy promotion suggests, the effect of the ideal will vary according to the objective political situation and the elites' rhetorical and symbolic use of it. The effect of an ideal depends on the salience of the ideal. As the Bush administration justified the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with democracy promotion and stepped up the rhetorical use of democracy in defense of the war efforts, democracy promotion will become more salient and, in turn, will have a more significant effect on citizens' decisions to support war efforts. Thus, the effect of democracy promotion will be stronger in 2004 compared to other years, while the effect of the belief in this ideal remains strong in other years. This hypothesis tests the proposition that an easily accessible posture due to elites' rhetorical use or political events will have a more significant effect on attitudes.

## 5. Data and measurement

For this study, the surveys conducted in 1998, 2004, 2008, and 2012 by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) are used. As the surveys included a variety of questions that are relevant to foreign policy related issues, they provide scholars with a useful tool to test the hypotheses. Furthermore, the surveys provide an important advantage over other data, in that they are conducted over different political time periods, thus reflecting different political contexts. The survey of 1998 reflects the period before the 9/11 attacks, while 2004 captures the public mood after the attacks. Similarly, the survey of 2008 reflects the time period of the public's disillusionment with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the survey of 2012 captures the time period of the end of the Iraq war and minimal attention to foreign policy due to the more critical problem of the economy.<sup>3</sup>

To measure the dependent variables – support for U.S. involvement in the wars – three sets of questions were used for the first hypothesis taken from the 2004 survey. The questions share the same format but differ in the task of U.S. troop deployment. The first set of questions asks respondents whether they would favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops in other parts of the world to defend allies in the following cases: if North Korea invaded South Korea (46% says favor); if China invaded Taiwan (35%); if Arab forces invaded Israel (44%); if the government of Pakistan requested our help against a radical Islamic revolution (52%); to be part of an international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan (61%); and to be part of a UN-sponsored force to help keep peace between India and Pakistan (53%). I created an index for deploying troops to defend allies by using these questions. The reliability scale (Cronbach's alpha scale) for this index is .78. The second set of questions asks respondents whether they would favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops in the following cases: to deal with humanitarian cases (74%); to stop a government from committing

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<sup>3</sup> The details of the surveys are provided in the Appendix.

genocide and killing large numbers of its own people (76%); to be part of an international peacekeeping force to enforce a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians (53%); and to install democratic governments in states where dictators rule (31%). I used these questions to construct an index for deploying troops to achieve idealistic foreign policy goals. The reliability scale for the second index is .54. The third set of questions asks about use of troops to fight drug lords in Colombia (54%) and to ensure the oil supply (56%). I constructed an index for deploying troops to protect domestic interests by using the third set of questions. The reliability scale for the third index is .49.

Although the latter two indexes are relatively less reliable than the customary standard, substantively the questions share similarity. The distinction of the three indexes is based on the nature of the tasks of the troops. The first group of tasks involves mainly protecting traditional and newly emerged allies from external threats; the second focused on realizing idealistic goals in the international arena; and the third exclusively concerns issues that are closely related to domestic material interests. These diverse sets of tasks provide an opportunity to test the role of democracy promotion in accounting for troop deployment under various scenarios. The items were linearly added to construct a scale.

To measure the independent variables that represent different foreign policy goals, I used the set of questions from the CCGA surveys asking respondents whether they believe certain U.S. foreign policy goals should be the most important, somewhat important or not important at all. One of the main independent variables – *democracy promotion* – is measured by using the question as to whether respondents believe that “helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations” should be the most important, somewhat important, or not important goal at all. Previously mentioned studies treated this question as a measure of “liberal internationalism” (Mandelbaum and Schneider 1979) or “global altruism” (Richman and others 1997). Since the argument of this paper is that democracy promotion is distinctive from other goals or postures, it is necessary to treat it differently from other types of liberal internationalism or altruism. It is treated as an ordered variable. A large majority of respondents believe in democracy promotion: 83% of respondents in 1998 say it is most important or somewhat important. But there is a significant drop in the years of 2004 (72%), 2008 (76%), and 2012 (73%) even though a large majority of citizens still believes in this value.

Other goals and postures are included in the model to control for the effect of another idealistic goal and other realistic goals. Another idealistic goal is *Humanitarianism*. It is measured by using two questions: whether respondents believe that “helping to improve the standard of living of those who live in the less developed countries” and “combating world hunger” should be the most important, somewhat important or not important goal at all. Large percentages of citizens believe in this value, and it remains relatively stable over the years: 96% in 1998, 91% in 2004, 92% in 2008, 90% in 2012. Since there was not a question on “combating world hunger” in the 2008 survey, the variable was constructed by using only one item for model 2 in Table 2. Thus, the two items are used to

construct the variable humanitarianism only in the set of models in Table 1. The percentages are based on the one item used.

Along with these idealistic goals, other foreign policy goals and postures include “militarism,” “domestic interests” and “internationalism”. In contrast to democracy promotion and humanitarianism, the following two goals represent those of realists. *Militarism* reflects the belief that maintaining strong military power is a critical goal for U.S. foreign policy, since it is the last resort and essential in ensuring national security. It represents the realist’s core belief in the importance of power. To establish this measure, the question is used which asked respondents whether they believe that “Maintaining superior military power worldwide” is the most important, somewhat important, or not important goal at all. An absolute majority of Americans believes that it is the most or somewhat important goal of U.S. to maintain superior military power worldwide: 93% in 1998, 94% in 2004, 93% in 2008, and 92% in 2012. This belief does not change much over the years, unlike the idealistic goals. It clearly shows the stability of the belief in militarism. Another variable which reflects the realist belief is *Domestic Interest*. It is measured by using two questions, which asked respondents whether “Protecting the jobs of American workers” and “Securing adequate supplies of energy” should be the most important, somewhat important, or not important goals at all. Similar to militarism, an absolute majority of people believe that protecting jobs and securing energy supplies are the most important or somewhat important goals of U.S. (98% in 1998, 99% in 2004, 98% in 2008, and 98% in 2012 for jobs; 97% in 1998, 98% in 2004, 99% in 2008, and 98% in 2012 for securing energy supplies). As there is no question on energy supply in 2012, I used the question on reducing oil dependency to construct the variable for the 2012 survey. To construct an index, these two items were linearly added, although their correlation is relatively low (.29, .34, and .29, and .36 in 1998, 2004, 2008, and 2012 respectively). As Holsti (2004) and Drezner (2008) pointed out, realistic goals are ranked higher than are idealistic goals.

*Internationalism* captures the enduring belief that it is in the U.S.’s interest to be actively involved in international politics. Studies (e.g. Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987) have shown that this posture is an important component in accounting for citizens’ opinions on foreign policy. To measure *Internationalism*, the following question was used: “Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs?” Although they are not as large as humanitarianism or militarism, a substantial majority of Americans believe in active involvement in world affairs, with the numbers changing only a bit after 2004: 69% in 1998, 70% in 2004, 67% in 2008, and 63% in 2012.

In addition to these values, two traditional political predispositions were used: partisanship and ideology. Partisanship is measured by using the 3 categories of Republicans, Independents, and Democrats. Ideology is measured on a 7-point scale ranging from strongly conservative to strongly liberal. Other demographic variables are controlled: age, gender, race, and education.

## 6. Findings

The result of estimations in Table 1 shows the effects of idealist and realist goals on individuals' support for troop deployments under various scenarios in 2004. Democracy promotion and humanitarianism play a significant role in

**Table 1: Democracy promotion and Support for Troop Use in 2004**

	Protect allies	Pursue Ideals	Domestic concerns
Humanitarianism	0.97*** (0.23)	1.26*** (0.13)	0.04 (0.09)
Democracy (some imp.)	0.18 (0.14)	0.33*** (0.08)	0.24*** (0.06)
Democracy (very imp.)	1.06*** (0.21)	0.84*** (0.12)	0.46*** (0.09)
Militarism (some imp.)	0.39 (0.24)	0.15 (0.14)	-0.00 (0.10)
Militarism (very imp.)	0.87*** (0.25)	0.28* (0.14)	0.25* (0.10)
Domestic interest	-0.65* (0.33)	0.17 (0.18)	0.53*** (0.13)
Internationalism	1.25*** (0.13)	0.45*** (0.08)	0.03 (0.05)
Independent	-0.16 (0.17)	0.04 (0.09)	-0.04 (0.07)
Democrats	-0.03 (0.16)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.11+ (0.06)
Ideology (high = lib)	-0.10* (0.05)	0.01 (0.03)	-0.04+ (0.02)
Female	-0.47*** (0.11)	-0.07 (0.06)	0.01 (0.05)
Blacks	-0.34 (0.21)	0.12 (0.12)	0.24** (0.09)
Others	-0.22 (0.17)	-0.03 (0.09)	0.09 (0.07)
Education	0.13* (0.06)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.11*** (0.02)
Age	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00+ (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)
Const	1.05* (0.51)	0.92** (0.28)	0.67** (0.20)
N	1016	1034	1,052
R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.28	0.18

\*\*\* p<0.001; \*\* p<0.01; \* p<0.05; + p<0.1; two tailed  
The estimation results are from OLS regression.

accounting for the public's support for sending U.S. troops under various scenarios in 2004. The estimation of the models in Table 1 is done by using the ordinary least square regression estimation. Since two of the dependent variables (the second and the third types of troop deployments) could be treated as ordinal level measures, it is possible to use either ordered logit or ordered probit estimation. But the alternative estimation results show the same results in substance.

Although other traditional sources of support for war - internationalism and militarism - show their strength of influence in three different scenarios of U.S. troop deployment, democracy promotion and humanitarianism account for a significant portion of the variance of support for the policies. In the case of sending troops to defend traditional allies - Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan - and newly emerged and strategically important countries in dealing with Al Qaeda - Pakistan and Afghanistan - those who believe in democracy promotion are more likely to be supportive of sending U.S. troops to these countries. The coefficient of democracy promotion ( $b = 1.06$ ) is statistically significant at the .05 level while other independent variables are controlled. As the dependent variable is measured in the range between 0 and 3, the coefficient size suggests that if a person believes democracy promotion is a very important goal, that person's support for troop deployment to protect allies will increase about 33 percent ( $1.06/3$ ) compared to a person who believes that democracy promotion is not important at all while other variables are controlled. Similarly, those individuals who believe in democracy promotion are more likely to support using troops to achieve idealistic goals ( $b = .84$ ): spreading democracy, dealing with humanitarian crises, and protecting ethnic minorities from genocides. These situations differ from the previous cases, in that they do not have any specific allies and enemy countries involved. The primary goal of these actions is to achieve idealistic purposes that can be broadly defined as universal ideals. Finally, the effect of democracy promotion on deploying military troops to deal with drug-related crimes and oil protection is also statistically significant ( $b = .46$ ,  $p = .01$ ). Those who believe in democracy promotion are more likely to be supportive of sending troops to protect oil supplies, a quintessential resource for the economy, and to control drug-related crimes.

The effect of humanitarianism shows a similar pattern to that of democracy promotion, except in explaining troop deployment for protecting America's own interests. Those who believe in humanitarianism are more likely to be supportive of sending troops to defend traditional and new allies ( $b = .97$ ) and to pursue idealistic goals ( $b = 1.26$ ). But humanitarianism has a limited effect on supporting troop deployment to deal with drug-related crimes and oil protection.

These results are consistent with the hypothesis that idealistic goals are important sources in explaining public support for military deployment. The strength of democracy promotion in accounting for troop deployment is impressive, because this effect remains strong even after we control for *militarism*, which is considered as one of the most prominent sources of support for troop use. Regardless of the type of military engagement (to protect allies, to pursue idealism, or to protect domestic

interests), individuals' belief in democracy promotion is one of the most influential sources of their support for using troops, which could be a war against a hostile country or simple, short term military interventions.

Similarly, humanitarianism accounts for the support for troop deployment to protect allies and achieve idealistic goals, as those individuals who believe in humanitarianism and are motivated by altruistic goals are willing to send troops to other parts of the world, even if that may cost American soldiers' lives. While humanitarianism shares similarity with democracy promotion in its influence on support for troop deployments to protect allies and achieve idealistic goals, it has a limited effect on citizens' support for protecting America's own domestic interests – drug-related crimes and oil protection. This suggests that those who believe in humanitarianism are more willing to support troop use when the task is more altruistic than self-interest serving. They may believe that non-militaristic means could achieve the goals of dealing with drug-related crimes and protecting oil.

In addition, consistent with the findings from other studies (e.g. Hurwitz and Peffley 1987, Herrmann et al. 1997), a traditional belief in *internationalism* shows a significant influence in accounting for the support for war. Those who believe that it is good for the U.S. to be more actively involved in world politics are more likely to be supportive of troop deployments in dealing with international affairs but not in addressing domestic concerns. Also, the results show that citizens' concern for realists' goals influence their support for troop use. *Militarism* and *domestic interest* show significant influence on citizens' support for troop deployment. Citizens who consider that maintaining the superior military power of the U.S. is the most important foreign policy goal are more likely to support war efforts in areas of conflict, to achieve the idealistic goals, and to protect domestic interests. Those who care about domestic interests are less likely to be supportive of troop deployments, except in the case of dealing with drug-related crimes and oil supplies. Consistent with other studies (Conover & Sapiro 1993, Eichenberg 2003), males are far more likely than females to be supportive of all types of military intervention.

It is important to note that these findings were based on the survey of 2004. Thus, the significant influence of democracy promotion on support for troop deployments may be a reflection of the specific political context that includes the terrorist attacks, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the elevated rhetoric of idealistic fervor by elites. In the following sections, this possibility will be checked by examining the effect of these goals in the different time periods of 1998, 2008, and 2012.

Table 2 shows the results of the analysis testing the second hypothesis that political context affects the effect of democracy promotion on support for troop deployment. It is testing whether the effect of a salient ideal – democracy promotion – is pronounced in 2004 compared to other periods of time that reflect a different political context. Especially, it is comparing the periods of pre-9/11, post-9/11, the continued wars in 2008, and the end of the Iraq war in 2012. The rationale of this test is to identify whether political context can make a difference

**Table 2: Support for troop deployment in pooled model**

	Coeff.	Std. Err.
Humanitarianism (some imp.)	0.12	(0.11)
Humanitarianism (very imp.)	0.28 *	(0.12)
Militarism (some imp.)	0.26*	(0.12)
Militarism (very imp.)	0.68 ***	(0.13)
Domestic Interests	-0.28	(0.16)
Internationalism	1.01***	(0.07)
Democracy promotion (some imp.)	0.50**	(0.18)
Democracy promotion (very imp.)	0.62**	(0.19)
Year: 2004	0.29	(0.20)
Year: 2008	-0.18	(0.24)
Year: 2012	0.12	(0.21)
democracy some imp. * 2004	-0.02	(0.22)
democracy very imp. * 2004	0.72 **	(0.28)
democracy some imp. * 2008	0.06	(0.24)
democracy very imp. * 2008	0.20	(0.28)
democracy some imp. * 2012	-0.17	(0.20)
democracy very imp. * 2012	0.17	(0.24)
Independents	-0.07	(0.08)
Democrats	-0.20**	(0.07)
Blacks	-0.14	(0.10)
Others	0.08	(0.08)
Ideology (high= liberal)	-0.03	(0.02)
Age	0.00	(0.00)
Education	0.06***	(0.02)
Female	-0.47***	0.06
cut1	1.47***	0.27
cut2	2.68***	0.27
cut3	3.71***	0.27
AIC	11390.45	
N	4477	

\*\*\* p<0.001; \*\* p<0.01; \* p<0.05; + p<0.1; two tailed

The estimation results are from Ordered Logit estimation.

in the way individuals use the salient ideal goal in forming their opinion on foreign policy. In this study, the important political context is the experience of the 9/11 attacks and the heightened perception of threat that followed this in combination with the Bush administration's changed foreign policy rhetoric. Also, the second important political context is the period of disillusionment and the reality of the dragging on of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the aftermath of the Iraq war in 2008. The expectation is that the effects of the belief in democracy promotion would be strongest during the period when democracy promotion becomes a salient issue due to the administration's effort to justify the war in Iraq. Thus, the effect of democracy promotion on troop deployment will be strongest in 2004 compared to the periods of pre-9/11, during the prolonged wars in 2008, or during the period of economic problems in 2012.

For the analysis, the dependent variable is constructed in a slightly different way than in the first hypothesis test. Since there are only three items that were commonly covered in the four surveys, these items are used to construct an index for the dependent variable. Three items ask respondents whether they support sending U.S. troops to defend the allies of South Korea, Taiwan, and Israel from the invasion of North Korea, China, and Arab countries, respectively. Since the identical question for one of the items does not exist in the 2008 and the 2012 surveys, the alternative question is used. This results in a less accurate measurement of the dependent variable in 2008. The question in 2008 and 2012 is "Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops to be part of an international peace-keeping force to enforce a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians?". The measurement of reliability of the dependent variable shows that it is still reliable. The Cronbach's alpha scales for the three items in each year are .708, .792, .629, and .601. The support for troop use in these 3 cases changes somewhat over time in the case of protecting South Korea. Support for protecting South Korea from North Korea was 35% in 1998, but it was up to 46% in 2004, and remained relatively stable in 2008 (42%) and 2012 (44%). In the case of sending troops to protect Taiwan from Chinese invasion, support is relatively low and stable over time: 31% in 1998, 35% in 2004, 32% in 2008, and 28% in 2012. For the case of protecting Israel from Arab countries invasion, forty five percent of respondents support in 1998, and the support level remains at 44% in 2004. The alternative measures of the question in 2008 (51%) and 2012 (52%) show a similar stability. The added scale shows a similar trend: lowest support in 1998 and highest in 2004, and a move downwards after 2004. It reflects the general mood and political contexts. The support for military force reflects peacetime in 1998, war time in 2004, dragging wars in 2008, and the end of war and the prominence of economic issues in 2012.

Since the dependent variable is a three item added scale, I used the ordered logit estimation method. To estimate the comparative effects of democracy promotion on support for troop deployment, the interaction model was used. The other goals (e.g. humanitarianism, militarism, and internationalism) do not show any variance over time. Thus the changing effect of goals is examined only for democracy promotion. This model captures the differential effect of democracy promotion by year and demonstrates that the coefficients of the interaction term between year 2004 and belief that democracy promotion is very important is positive and statistically significant at a .05 level ( $b = .72$ ). At the same time the coefficient of a high level of belief in democracy promotion is still positive and statistically significant at a .01 level ( $b = .62$ ). This means that the effect of democracy promotion on support for troop deployment in 2004 is about .10 points larger than the base category of 1998, in which democracy promotion has a significant positive effect on sending troops. The non-significant coefficient of interaction between other years (2008 and 2012) and democracy promotion shows that the difference between 1998 and other years is not significant.




Figure 1. Predicted probabilities of Troop Deployment support by democracy and year

The conditional effect of democracy promotion can be examined more properly by using the graph which is based on the predicted probabilities of the ordered logit model. As other studies have proposed (e.g. Kam and Franzese 2007, Aiken and West 1991, Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006), an intuitive and proper way to probe the interaction effects is to get the predicted probabilities of the dependent variable over varying ranges of democracy promotion and year while holding the other variables constant along with other independent variables. Figure 1 shows the interaction effect of democracy promotion and years<sup>4</sup>. These are predicted

<sup>4</sup> Since the lines are too close to show the 95% confidence intervals around them, they are omitted. They are all positive, which means that the coefficients over the range of democracy promotion are statistically significant. I used “effects” package in R to get the predicted probabilities (Fox and Hong 2009). I set other independent variables at their mode or mean while getting the probabilities for the interaction term.

probabilities based on the ordered logit estimation results from model 2. Consistent with the findings in Table 2, the effect of democracy promotion in each year is significantly different from 0, which means that democracy promotion has a meaningful influence in accounting for individuals' support for troop use in different contexts.

A more important finding is that the effect of democracy promotion in 2004 is greater than those of other years. The first rows of the panels show the predicted probabilities for supporting all three cases of troop deployment by the level of democracy promotion and years. As we move from a lower level of belief in democracy promotion (i.e. not important at all) to a higher level of it (i.e. very important) the support for troop deployment increases in all years, but the magnitudes of the influence of the belief in democracy promotion increased more significantly (from .15 to .40) in 2004 than in other years, which makes this year stand out from other years.

These findings confirm the expectation that the effect of democracy promotion on troop support will change in reaction to external events or political context. This reflects the political situation in which the idealistic goal received prominent attention due to the Bush administration's effort to justify the Iraq war in the name of democracy promotion against the background of heightened concern for terrorism after the experience of the 9/11 attacks. While democracy promotion has been used to justify the U.S. military intervention or engagement in war in the past, the intensity of the use of democracy promotion by President Bush and the media grew stronger after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. My own analysis of President Bush's addresses and speeches from 2001 to 2007 shows that he used "democracy," "democracy promotion," "liberty," or "freedom" more frequently in 2004 and 2005 compared to previous years (2001 or 2002) and post 2006. He mentioned these words 43 and 45 times in 2001 and 2002, respectively, and 101, 118, and 243 times in 2003, 2004, and 2005, respectively. There were almost 3 times as many uses in 2004 as in 2001. The frequency is even greater in 2005, but it began to decrease by 2007 (83 times). Although there was a slight increase in 2008 (111 times), President Obama rarely mentioned the ideal goals by 2012 (10 times)<sup>5</sup>. Thus, the finding suggests a fluctuation in the effect of democracy promotion on public opinion on the war efforts. When the ideal becomes more salient and easily available under certain contexts (e.g. on going wars and presidents' rhetorical usage), citizens are more likely to adopt the ideal in forming their opinion on foreign policy.

## **7. Discussion and conclusions**

This study examines the role of democracy promotion, which is considered as one of the central foreign policy goals, in understanding public opinion on foreign

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<sup>5</sup> The addresses and speeches are available from the Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (<http://www.gpo.gov/>).

policy. The findings confirm the proposition that idealism plays a significant role in shaping citizens' opinions on foreign affairs. As was expected, given the political context in which America experienced the terrorist attack in its own soil and the emotional feeling was heightened against real external enemies, vindicational idealism plays a significant role in defining public support for sending U.S. troops to defend allies, to achieve idealistic goals, and to secure domestic interests. The fundamental characteristics of democracy promotion – in particular, the belief in the mission of being an exemplary country in the world – are a major source of support for troop deployment, even if doing that could risk the lives of many soldiers. As the discussion of vindicationalism's style of democracy promotion suggests (e.g. Monten 2005, Brands 1998), the belief becomes a powerful source for accounting for the adoption of militant policies. Especially when there exist political conditions under which vindicationalism could become popular, belief in democracy promotion could work as a solid basis for using the military. As Monten (2005) has shown in laying out the role of this ideal, it becomes more accentuated due to the changed political context: the U.S. as a unipolar super power, the experience of the terrorist attacks, and the wars. Furthermore, this finding shows that democracy promotion is not a new ideal that the Bush administration suddenly invented to justify the Iraq war. It had been a central symbolic element of the American creed and nationalism that had existed from the beginning of this country and has been used frequently to justify war efforts in the past.

It is worth mentioning that the finding on the prominent and consistent effect of belief in democracy promotion on support for troop deployment does not suggest that idealistic goals are the only motivating source for the mass public's support for troop use. Instead, the results show that citizens are also motivated by their concern for realist goals – maintaining superior military power and securing domestic interests – in forming their opinion on military deployment. The results suggest that both realists' concerns and idealists' concerns are the motivating forces that account for American citizens' foreign policy opinion formation. But when the magnitudes of two types of considerations are compared, the public is giving more weight to idealism.

The findings also confirm that the prominent role of democracy promotion in accounting for citizens' support for war is a product of political context as well as the inherent characteristics of belief in the goal. On the one hand, the belief in democracy promotion strongly influenced the public on their opinion on support for war in 1998, 2004, 2008, and 2012. On the other hand, the effect of this ideal was stronger in 2004 compared to other years. What this shows is the relatively stable effect of the goal over different political contexts: different presidents invoking the ideal and justifying foreign policy with it, the existence of a national security threat, and the experience of war and the aftermath of war. Despite these differences, the effect of the ideal on public support for troop use in defending allies is consistently strong. However, the effect of the ideal becomes more pronounced in 2004, when democracy promotion was more frequently emphasized

by the president and the elites in an effort to justify their decision to invade Iraq; the debate among the elites became intense; and the media paid closer attention to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the war. Such an environment provides a fertile ground to strengthen the salience of the ideal; in turn, individuals more easily use the accessible ideal in justifying their support for the war. While a belief in a goal maintains its stable effect on opinion formation, its impact can change as political contexts influence the effect of the belief in the ideal goal on opinion formation. The existence of a varying effect of democracy promotion suggests that belief in this ideal functions like heuristics or shortcuts, in that the effect of this belief on individuals' opinion formation depends on the salience and accessibility of the ideal, which are determined by political context. This finding is consistent with previous studies that propose a central effect of values and postures in defining opinion (e.g. Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999, Hurwitz and Peffley 1987) and the changing effect of a posture according to political context (e.g. Peffley and Hurwitz 1992). Political context provides elites with an opportunity to use idealism to justify their foreign policy decision and presents the public with conditions in which they are readily exposed to this idealism so that they easily use the idealism to form their opinion. Thus, the more pronounced effect of democracy promotion on public support for troop deployment in 2004 suggests that the effect of the belief in idealism is not only an outcome of long-held normative beliefs but also the salience and availability of idealism.

In conclusion, this study shows two main findings from the data analysis on American citizens' opinion on troop deployment. First, the results show that American citizens' belief in democracy promotion is one of the most important sources in accounting for their support for troop deployment to achieve various tasks. It suggests that, although American citizens' belief in realistic goals and concerns is a critical source in making their opinion on sending troops to other parts of the world, still an idealistic goal, democracy promotion, plays a significant role in forming their foreign policy opinion. Second, the effect of belief in democracy promotion varies by political context, including the existence of an external threat and elites' invoking of idealism in making sense of their foreign policy decision. While individuals' belief in democracy promotion is stable and has roots in American tradition and culture, if the ideal becomes salient and easily accessible to the public as political elites emphasize idealism under the relevant political contexts (e.g. an on-going war or external attack on American soil) citizens are more likely to rely on this idealism in forming their opinion on foreign policy.

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## APPENDIX

The surveys were conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA) in 1998, 2004, 2008, and 2012. This data set is available from the CCGA, the Interuniversity Consortium of Political and Social Research (ICPSR) or the Roper Center. The survey in 1998 has total respondents of 1,507. Interviews were conducted by using telephone during October 15-November 10, 1998. The three other surveys (2004, 2008, and 2012) were conducted by Knowledge Networks (KN). The survey of 2004 was conducted during July 6-12 with total respondents of 1,195. Similarly, the survey of 2008 was conducted during July 3-15 with total respondents of 1,505, and the survey of 2012 was conducted during May 25-June 8 with total respondents of 1,877. Knowledge Networks uses an internet based survey in which the households are randomly selected based on telephones. Individual respondents who were chosen by this random sampling were given computers so that they could participate in the survey.

**Dependent Variables:**

There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. Please give your opinion about some situations. Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops:

If North Korea invaded South Korea (1998, 2004, 2008, 2012)

If China invaded Taiwan (1998, 2004, 2008, 2012)

If Arab forces invaded Israel (1998, 2004)

To be part of an international peacekeeping force to enforce a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians (2008, 2012)

If the government of Pakistan requested our help against a radical Islamic revolution (2004)

To be part of an international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan (2004)

To be part of a UN-sponsored force to help keep peace between India and Pakistan (2004)

To be part of an international peacekeeping force to enforce a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians (2004)

To stop a government from committing genocide and killing large numbers of its own people (2004)

To install democratic governments in states where dictators rule (2004)

To deal with humanitarian crises (2004)

To fight drug lords in Columbia (2004)

To ensure the oil supply (2004)

**Independent Variables:**

Below is a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please select whether you think that it should be a very

important foreign policy goal of the United States, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all?

*Democracy Promotion*

Helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations

*Militarism*

Maintaining superior military power worldwide.

*Domestic Interest*

Protecting the jobs of American workers

Securing adequate supplies of energy (for 1998, 2004, and 2008)

Reducing the foreign oil dependency (2012)

*Internationalism*

Do you think it will be best for the future of the country if we take an active part in world affairs or if we stay out of world affairs (yes, no)?

*Partisanship:*

How would you describe your party affiliation? : Republican=1, Independent = 2, Democrat = 3

*Political Ideology:*

How would you describe your political views: as extremely conservative = 1, extremely liberal = 6?

*Education:* What is the highest degree or level of education that you have completed? (less than high school, high school, some college, bachelor's degree or higher)

*Gender:* Gender of Respondent (male = 0: female = 1)

*Age:* Age of respondent.



